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COMMENTS
THE BOOK INCOME ADJUSTMENT IN THE
1986 TAX REFORM ACT CORPORATE
MINIMUM TAX: HAS CONGRESS
ADDED NEEDLESS COMPLEXITY
IN THE NAME OF FAIRNESS?
by Sandra G. Soneff Redmond
A recent survey indicated that of the nation's 259 largest and most
profitable companies, forty-four paid zero or negative federal income
taxes for the tax years 1981 through 1984.1 During the same period
these forty-four companies grew by eleven percent, increased their dividend
payouts by twenty-two percent, and added fifty-four percent to their top ex-
ecutives' salaries. 2 The average wage earner, on the other hand, generally
has not escaped the tax bite. 3 Public reaction to such inherent inequities in
the tax system often erupts into outspoken dissatisfaction 4 and a marked
decrease in respect for, and compliance with, the tax laws.5
1. CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, MONEY FOR NOTHING-THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE
TAX INCENTIVES 1981-1984, at 9 (1986).
2. Id.; see McIntyre, Do Investment Tax Incentives Work? Funding Mergers and Higher
Salaries, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1986, § 3 (Business), at 2F, col. 2.
3. Federal taxes on low and middle income individuals have more than doubled since
1979. CITIZEN FOR TAX JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 15. Recently, some Fortune 500 companies
have paid less in taxes than the people who waxed the companies' floors or typed the compa-
nies' letters. Id.
4. For example, in 1969 Secretary of the Treasury Joseph Bar issued a report stating that
over 150 taxpayers with $200,000 or more of adjusted gross income paid no income tax. This
generated a public response of more letters to Congress that year than had been received on
any other subject. Tax Reform Proposals-XXI" Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Fi-
nance, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1985) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Professor Michael J.
Graetz, Yale Law School).
5. A recent New York Times article discussed a recent poll commissioned by the Internal
Revenue Service and conducted by the Daniel Yankelovich firm. That study, according to the
article, "found that one-third of those polled considered cheating on taxes perfectly acceptable,
one-third were ambivalent and only the remaining third thought tax cheating was wrong. The
Reagan Administration's Commissioner of Internal Revenue has characterized tax cheating as
the 'revenge' of citizens against an unfair system." Haskell, The Bottom Line of Real Tax
Reform, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1986, at Y23, col. 2 (nat'l ed.). According to a Time article, tax
evasion has more than doubled between 1976 and 1981, from $42.6 billion to $90.5 billion.
Church, The Making of a Miracle-Against All Odds, Congress Hammers Out a Radical Tax
Reform Plan, TIME, Aug. 25, 1986, at 12; see also Nacey, Public Attitudes and Taxes, 32 TAX
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For over a decade the minimum tax concept has been a part of the polit-
ical response to this public outcry. Both Republicans and Democrats have
long included a minimum tax as a tax reform showpiece. 6 Although the idea
of a minimum tax is politically popular, much controversy exists over how
such a tax should operate.
The Tax Reform Act of 19867 contains a strict corporate minimum tax
provision.8 This Comment analyzes the new corporate minimum tax provi-
sions with emphasis from a policy perspective on the new book income ad-
justment item. The book income adjustment allows the government to tax
one-half of a corporation's net income, as reported on the corporation's ap-
plicable financial statement, that exceeds the corporation's regular minimum
taxable income.9 This very significant provision has generated much contro-
versy and debate over the propriety of reliance on financial accounting
figures for income tax purposes. Congress itself lacks confidence in the de-
tails of this provision: the Act replaces the book income adjustment ap-
proach with another approach for tax years beginning after 1989 and
commissions a Treasury report to explore the operation and effect of each
approach.10 The Treasury report is to be completed before the 1989
switch.1  Future revisions and fine tuning of the book income adjustment
provision are both necessary and likely.
For an insightful critique of the book income adjustment, an understand-
ing of the history and justifications of minimum tax provisions is helpful.
Section I of this Comment briefly examines the history and justifications of
the minimum tax. Since computation of the book income adjustment re-
quires the use of financial accounting procedures, section II of this Comment
examines case law dealing with the use of financial accounting for income
tax purposes. Section III reviews the operation and legislative history of
book income adjustment. Finally, section IV addresses the question of
whether the book income adjustment adds needless complexity to the tax
system in the name of fairness. Following discussion of this issue, the sec-
tion poses and evaluates three alternative approaches to the problems that
the book income adjustment is meant to address.
NOTES, July 7, 1986, at 17 (discussing results of annual survey of public attitudes toward
government and taxes, conducted for Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
that shows public dissatisfaction with the tax system).
6. Graetz, The 1982 Minimum Tax Amendments as a First Step in the Transition to a
"Flat-Rate" Tax, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 543 (1983).
7. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-.',14, 100 Stat. 2085.
8. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also includes a noncorporate minimum tax provision.
That provision, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally 4 Fed. Tax
Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) I A-8200 (1986) (overview ot pre-1986 Act minimum tax on
noncorporate taxpayers); Summary of Conference Agreement on H.R. 3838 (Tax Reform Act
of 1986), [Bulletin 38 Extra] Fed. Taxes (P-H) $ 59,711, at 25 (Aug. 29, 1986) (brief overview
of changes in new Act regarding individual income tax).
9. I.R.C. § 56(f) (1986).
10. H.R. Co,'w. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-278 (1986).
11. Id. at 11-278 to -79.
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE MINIMUM TAX
A. Development of the Minimum Tax
The first minimum tax provision appeared in the Internal Revenue Code
in 1969.12 The provision created a minimum tax on tax preferences 13 as
recommended by President Nixon's 1969 tax reform proposals. 14 The impe-
tus for President Nixon's recommendation came from the 1968 Treasury
Tax Reform Studies under the Johnson Administration. 15 The ideas found
in the 1968 Treasury Tax Reform Studies can be traced to Democratic Sena-
tor Russell Long's proposals made in 1964.16 Senator Long proposed a sim-
plified tax under which taxpayers could choose to apply a lower rate
schedule to an expanded tax base rather than applying the regular rate in the
normal manner. 17 This proposal was criticized and rejected on the grounds
that its elective nature would add complexity to the tax system.18
As enacted in 1969 the minimum tax applied to individuals and corpora-
tions. 19 The purpose behind the minimum tax was to limit the portion of
economic income that taxpayers could exclude from taxation through vari-
ous tax preferences in the income tax law.20 The motivation behind the
12. I.R.C. §§ 56-58 (1986).
13. A tax preference, in a general sense, is any economic income that is not taxed, such as
deductions and exclusions. Applicable Code provisions designate those items that constitute a
tax preference for any particular Code provision. Tax preference items for purposes of the
corporate minimum tax are listed in id. § 57. J. PARKER, INTRODUCTION TO TAXATION: A
DECISION MAKING APPROACH 343 (1984). See generally M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION 334-40 (4th ed. 1985) (discussion of value of a tax preference).
14. Graetz, supra note 6, at 545 (citing Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means on the Subject of Tax Reform, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5050-63, 5504-05 (1969)).
15. Id. at 544 (citing UNITED STATES DEPT. OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND
PROPOSALS 132 (Comm. Print 1969)).
16. Id. at 545.
17. Id. at 543 (citing S. 3250, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964)); see also S. 2760, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966) (reintroduced the 1964 proposal).
18. Graetz, supra note 6, at 543 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 23,087-98 (1964); 109 CONG.
REC. 19,706 (1963)); see also Bittker, An Optional-Simplified Income Tax?, 21 TAX L. REV. 1,
12-19 (1965) (discussion of Senator Long's proposal); Dodyk, Tax Simplification: The Long
Amendment and the Mills Proposal, 25 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1443, 1449 (1967) (discussion of
complexities of Senator Long's proposal).
19. Graetz, supra note 6, at 545 (citing Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,§ 301, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 56-58 (1982)). The House version of the
Act applied only to individuals. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1969
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1646.
Professor Graetz, who worked for the Treasury Department on the first minimum tax provi-
sions, has noted that the 1969 minimum tax for corporations was not as well received as that
for individuals. Hearing, supra note 4, at 43 (statement of Professor Michael J. Graetz, Yale
Law School). According to Professor Graetz:
Neither the Treasury Departments of the Johnson or Nixon Administrations
had proposed or supported a corporate minimum tax, and no corporate mini-
mum tax provision was contained in the House version of the 1969 act.... [The
Senate proposed] corporate minimum tax was enacted principally to make up
the revenue loss that would otherwise have occurred from the Senate's restruc-
turing of the House minimum tax provisions.
Id.
20. Coven, The Alternative Minimum Tax: Proving Again that Two Wrongs Do Not Make
a Right, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (1980) (citing H. R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
8-11, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1652-56)).
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adoption of the minimum tax in 1969, as well as in 1986, was Congress's
concern with negative public perception of the tax law.2 1
The 1969 provision, applicable to both individuals and corporations, con-
sisted of a ten percent add-on tax. This provision required the taxpayer first
to compute its regular tax and then to calculate its amount of tax prefer-
ences.22 The taxpayer next applied a $30,000 exemption to the aggregate
preference amount. The taxpayer then subtracted from that amount its reg-
ular tax paid for the year to yield a net amount that would be subject to the
minimum tax. Finally, the taxpayer added ten percent of this net amount to
its regular tax liability.
Commentators have argued that this add-on tax had little if any effect
because of the $30,000 exclusion, the deduction for taxes owed, and the lim-
ited list of included preference items. 23 The limitations of the tax were ex-
plainable, perhaps, because of the competing policies that Congress faced in
considering the tax. On the one hand, Congress faced public reaction to
perceived inequities in the Code; Congress could not ignore a public man-
date to ensure that high income taxpayers paid their fair share of tax. On
the other hand, Congress had a tax code with tax incentives designed to
stimulate certain economic sectors and achieve social objectives. 24 Congress
was forced, therefore, to give with one hand and take away with the other.
Congress was able to encourage certain activity, but remained ready to pe-
nalize if the response to that encouragement was too strong. The govern-
ment, no doubt, implemented the minimum tax in order to avoid eliminating
tax preferences, a move that could have caused severe political backlashes.
At the same time, members of Congress had a provision to display to their
constituents as an example of efforts to make the tax code fair.
From 1969 to 1982 the minimum tax rules went through minor modifica-
tions. In 1970 Congress added a seven-year carry-forward of regular income
taxes. 25 The Revenue Act of 1971 then added a new tax preference item, 26
the excess of rapid amortization over straight-line depreciation of job train-
21. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 8-11, reprinted in 1969 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1645, 1652-56.
22. The list of preferences included: (1) accelerated depreciation in excess of straight-line
depreciation on real estate; (2) accelerated depreciation in excess of straight-line depreciation
on personal property subject to a net lease; (3) amortization of pollution control facilities in
excess of the accelerated depreciation of such facilities; (4) amortization of railroad rolling
stock in excess of accelerated depreciation; (5) at the time of exercise of an employee stock
option, the excess of the fair market value of the optioned shares over the option price; (6)
excess of bad debt deduction over an amount that would have been allowed based on actual
bad debts; (7) percentage depletion in excess of the adjusted basis of property; (8) excluded
portion of capital gains. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 487
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 56-58 (1982)).
23. Coven, supra note 20, at 1095-96. Coven argues that the Senate was willing to penal-
ize only the most extreme use of tax preferences. Id. at 1096.
24. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 46 (1986) (investment tax credit); id. § 22 (formerly § 37) (tax credit
for the elderly); id. § 169 (pollution control facilities deduction); id. § 280(g) (disallowance of
deduction for golden parachute payments and imposition of excise tax on same).
25. Id. § 56(c) (1974) (current version at I.R.C. § 55(e)(2) (1986)).
26. Id. § 57(a)(10) (1971) (repealed 1982).
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ing and child care facilities. 27 Changes in 1976 increased the minimum tax
rate from ten to fifteen percent and eliminated the $30,000 deduction and the
deduction for regular tax paid.28 The 1976 changes also added a new ex-
emption, the greater of $10,000 or one-half of the regular tax owed for the
year.29 Along with other modifications, these 1976 changes significantly in-
creased the total amount of tax collected through the minimum tax
provisions.3 0
In 1978 Congress focused its concern on capital formation and energy. 31
As a result of this focus, Congress altered the minimum tax rules as they
applied to individuals. The alteration created two minimum tax methods for
individuals. One method was the old, add-on minimum tax on tax prefer-
ences with capital gains preferences deleted.32 The other method was an
alternative minimum tax with a separate tax base and separate rate schedules
that applied to capital gains and adjusted itemized deductions. 33 The Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 198234 eliminated the two-tier mini-
mum tax for individuals and replaced it with a single, fortified, alternative
tax for individuals. 35 The minimum tax for corporations, however, re-
mained an add-on tax.36
The corporate minimum tax rules existing before the enactment of the
1986 Act required corporations to pay an add-on tax of fifteen percent of the
corporation's tax preferences that exceeded the greater of $10,000 or the
regular tax liability for the year.3 7 In addition to this add-on minimum tax,
pre-Act law imposed a cutback in the use of certain corporate tax prefer-
ences.3 8 An adjustment was made to the add-on minimum tax, however, so
27. See id. § 188 (1986). Rapid amortization would yield a larger depreciation deduction
in early years than would straight line depreciation. A deduction in early years is more valua-
ble than the same deduction in later years because of the time value of money.
28. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 301, 90 Stat. 1549, 1550 (1976) (amending I.R.C. §§ 56-58).
29. Id.
30. Graetz, supra note 6 at 547.
31. Coven, supra note 20, at 1097 n.19 (citing U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, THE PRESIDENT'S
1978 TAX BUDGET (1978)). Coven explains that the change in focus under the Carter Admin-
istration was a swing of the pendulum from using the income tax system to promote equity to
using the tax system to stimulate economic and social policies. Id. at 1097.
32. I.R.C. § 56 (1979) (amended 1982).
33. Id. § 55 (1986) (added by the Revenue Act of 1978); see Coven, supra note 20, at
1097-98 (criticizing the 1978 changes as introducing unneeded complexity); Graetz, supra note
6, at 548-49 (explaining provision).
34. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
35. See Graetz, supra note 6, at 549-54.
36. The corporate minimum tax provisions have not developed to the same extent as the
individual minimum tax provisions. Graetz argues that the corporate minimum tax provisions
"have never quite overcome their uncertain beginnings." Hearing, supra note 4, at 37 (state-
ment of Professor Michael J. Graetz, Yale Law School).
37. I.R.C. § 56 (1986). Regular tax liability for purposes of this section is defined by
§ 56(c). Tax preference categories include: (1) exclusion of dividends; (2) accelerated depreci-
ation on real property; (3) accelerated depreciation on leased personal property; (4) amortiza-
tion of certified pollution control facilities; (5) mining exploration and development costs; (6)
circulation and research and experimental expenditures; (7) reserves for losses on bad debts of
financial institutions; (8) depletion; (9) capital gains; (10) incentive stock options; (11) intangi-
ble drilling costs; and (12) accelerated cost recovery deduction. Id. § 57.
38. Id. § 291. This cutback applied in differing degrees to the following: certain capital
gains; reduction in percentage depletion; certain financial institution preference items; certain
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
that the tax covered only a certain percentage of a preference that was also
subject to the cutback provision. 39 This adjustment was necessary to pre-
vent the cumulative effect of the add-on minimum tax provision and the
cutback in preference use provision from neutralizing the incentive effect of a
tax preference. 4°
B. Justifications for a Minimum Tax
Congress first introduced the minimum tax provisions as a result of per-
ceived inequities in the tax code. 41 The minimum tax provided the legisla-
tors with a compromise vehicle to avoid directly resolving the conflicting
purposes of the income tax, those of raising revenue fairly, and stimulating
certain economic and social activities. 42 Such a compromise is politically
attractive in that it pleases the public because it sounds fair and, by not
revoking preferences, it does not alienate special interest groups. Further-
more, because the impact of such a tax is difficult to measure, political ac-
countability is not of paramount concern.43
A minimum tax can be viewed from three perspectives: revenue, fairness,
and complexity. 44 With respect to revenue, commentators argue that the
most effective minimum tax, in terms of supporting the regular tax system, is
one that does not raise any revenue.4 5 The 1969 minimum tax provisions
allowed generous exceptions and consequently had little revenue effect. 46 In
1982 the strengthened minimum tax raised less than $500 million from cor-
porations. 47 Commentators have generally argued that the main objective of
a minimum tax should not be to raise revenue, but rather to influence corpo-
rations to structure their activities so as to avoid the application of the mini-
mum tax.48 Higher regular tax liability would accrue as a result.
deferred FSC (foreign sales corporation) income; and amortization of pollution control facili-
ties. Id. § 291(a).
39. Id. § 57(b). Only 59-5/6% of the pollution control facilities preference and the bad
debt reserves preference were taken into account as an item of tax preference for purposes of
the minimum tax. The same percentage applied to certain capital gains. Only 71.6% of the
iron ore and coal preference was included as a tax preference for purpose of the minimum tax.
Id.
40. Explanation of Tax Reform Act of 1984, 71 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 29,
266 (July 6, 1984).
41. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
42. Hearing, supra note 4, at 37, 39 (statement of Professor Michael J. Graetz, Yale Law
School); id. at 56 (statement of Professor Harry Gutman, University of Pennsylvania Law
School); id. at 69 (statement of Emil Sunley, Deloitte Haskins and Sells).
43. Id. at 57 (statement of Professor Harry Gutman, University of Pennsylvania Law
School).
44. Id.
45. Id. Graetz, however, argues that although a minimum tax may not generate income
itself, it will result in an increase in revenue from the regular tax. Id. at 52 (statement of
Professor Michael J. Graetz, Yale Law School). "It is only an accident of accounting that the
increase in revenue produced under the regular income tax due to the existence of an effective
minimum tax is not attributed to the minimum tax." Id.
46. Id. at 9, 13 (statement of Bernard Shapiro, National Director for Tax Policy, Price
Waterhouse).
47. Id. at 70 (statement of Emil Sunley, Deloitte Haskins and Sells).
48. Id. at 57 (statement of Professor Harry Gutman, University of Pennsylvania Law
School); id. at 14 (statement of Bernard Shapiro, National Director for Tax Policy, Price
1224 [Vol. 40
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A minimum tax provision may increase the fairness of the tax system, at
least as the minimum tax applies to individuals. 49 A corporate minimum tax
is not as easily justified, however. Corporations are subject to fluctuations in
income, whereas individual income is generally more stable.50 In addition,
high corporate income does not translate into ability to pay as readily as
does high individual income.51 A corporate minimum tax also may not
bring about fairness because the tax may be distorted across firms in the
same industry depending on the amount of regular tax liability available to a
corporation to enable it to avoid the minimum tax. 52 Furthermore, corpora-
tions will likely pass the burden of the minimum tax on to their shareholders
and customers, who presumably pay their share of tax already.5 3
On the other hand, a corporate minimum tax does prevent the corporate
entity from becoming a device that an individual can use to avoid individual
income taxes.54 The minimum tax may also decrease wide disparities in cor-
porate tax burdens within and among industries55 that result from variations
in debt financing, gains and losses, and accounting practices. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the perception of tax equity will increase if an
effective minimum tax eliminates the possibility that high economic income
corporations may pay little or no tax.56
A minimum tax undoubtedly adds complexity to the tax system. A mini-
mum tax is at least partially justified, however, by its corresponding fairness
and political attractiveness. The current tax system does not include a broad
base flat rate tax; the minimum tax is, therefore, generally a necessary com-
promise and worth the added complexity. Whether the book income adjust-
ment aspect of the minimum tax is necessary, fair, and worth the added
complexity is addressed later in this Comment.
Waterhouse); id. at 70-71 (statement of Emil Sunley, Deloitte Haskins and Sells). More direct
ways exist to increase revenue than through a minimum tax. Using the minimum tax primarily
to raise revenue would be a direct assault on the tax incentives in the Code. Furthermore, a
revenue raising focus does not provide a principle on which to structure a minimum tax that
will fortify the regular tax system. Rather, such a focus will only result in a minimum tax
system that will clash with the regular tax system. The proper focus of a minimum tax is to
ensure that taxpayers pay their fair share of tax in the regular tax system by imposing penal-
ties in the form of minimum tax liability for excessive use of regular tax preferences.
49. Id. at 41 (statement of Professor Michael J. Graetz, Yale Law School); id. at 58-59
(statement of Professor Harry Gutman, University of Pennsylvania Law School); id. at 6
(statement of Bernard Shapiro, National Director for Tax Policy, Price Waterhouse); id. at 71-
72 (statement of Emil Sunley, Deloitte Haskins and Sells).
50. Id. at 8 (statement of Bernard Shapiro, National Director for Tax Policy, Price
Waterhouse).
51. Id. at 42 (statement of Professor Michael J. Graetz, Yale Law School).
52. Id. at 73 (statement of Emil Sunley, Deloitte Haskins and Sells). As an example,
Sunley posed the situation of a company with numerous tax preferences. Id. Standing alone,
such a company may have a minimum tax liability. Id. If the company is part of a diversified
group, however, the group on a consolidated basis may have enough regular tax liability to
avoid minimum tax liability. Id.
53. Id. at 53-74.
54. Id. at 44 (statement of Professor Michael J. Graetz, Yale Law School).
55. Id. at 44-45.
56. Id. at 45-46.
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II. THE USE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FOR TAX PURPOSES: THOR
POWER TOOL Co. v CoMMIsSIONER
The income adjustment item included in the new corporate minimum tax
is based on income as reported and calculated using financial accounting
standards. Consideration of how the courts have viewed the use of financial
accounting for income tax purposes is, therefore, important. A recent
Supreme Court case, Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner,5 7 is the leading
case in this regard. 58
Thor involved valuation issues concerning inventories and bad-debt
reserves. The Tax Court disallowed an inventory write-down 59 that con-
formed to generally accepted accounting principles on the grounds that such
a write-down failed to reflect Thor's income clearly. 6° The Supreme Court
affirmed. 6
1
In Thor the taxpayer's primary argument was that the write-down con-
formed with generally accepted accounting principles and thus, unless the
Commissioner could demonstrate otherwise, clearly reflected income within
the meaning of the Code.62 The Supreme Court rejected this argument on
the basis of past decisions and the differing objectives of tax and financial
accounting. 63 The Court concluded that, for tax purposes, a taxpayer could
not take a current deduction for future estimated losses in inventory. 64
In analyzing past cases the Thor Court indicated that prepaid income is
recognized for tax purposes when received, although such a practice mis-
matches revenue and expenses in contradiction of generally accepted ac-
counting principles.6 5  The Court pointed out that financial and tax
57. 439 U.S. 522 (1979).
58. See Committees on Alternative Minimum Tax and Corporations of the New York
State Bar Association Tax Section, The Senate's Proposed Book Income Minimum Tax Prefer-
ence, 32 TAX NOTES, Aug. 11, 1986, at 569, 571 [hereinafter Committees] (discussion of Thor
in relation to timing issues); Uhlfelder, Earnings and Profits May Replace Book Income As
AMT Preference; SEC will Not Lobby on Issue, 32 TAX NOTES, July 21, 1986, at 197 (discus-
sion of Thor in relation to administrative problems); Current and Quotable, 31 TAX NOTES,
June 9, 1986, at 1024 (text of letter from former IRS Commissioner Alexander to Treasury
citing Thor for evidence that use of financial accounting for tax purposes would be inequitable
and unenforceable).
59. Closing inventory is valued at the lower of cost or market value. When the market
value is used for inventory valuation, the result is referred to as an inventory write-down, the
effect of which is to reduce net income. See R. AMORY, JR. & C. HARDEE, MATERIALS ON
ACCOUNTING 178-79 (3d ed. 1959).
60. Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 154, 175 (1975).
61. 439 U.S. at 537.
62. Id. at 538-39. The Thor Court relied on Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (as amended in
1986) for the proposition that compliance with generally accepted accounting principles will
ordinarily clearly reflect income. 439 U.S. at 538-39.
63. 439 U.S. at 540.
64. Id. at 542.
65. Id. at 541. The Thor Court based this observation on American Auto. Ass'n v. United
States, 367 U.S. 687, 690 (1961). When an association receives dues covering a period that
extends past the reporting year, American Auto. held that the association must report the full
amount of the membership dues as income when the dues are received, rather than merely the
amount that corresponds with the number of membership months in the reporting year cov-
ered by those dues. Id. at 689. The American Auto. Court went on to say that just because an
1226 [Vol. 40
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accounting may characterize transactions differently66 and may treat timing
issues differently67 because of the vastly different objectives of financial and
tax accounting. 68 Financial accounting is designed to provide useful infor-
mation to management, shareholders, and creditors; tax accounting seeks to
achieve the equitable collection of revenue. 69 This difference understandably
results in inconsistent treatment of accounting issues. 70
According to Thor, an important factor in determining appropriate tax
accounting standards is the administrative burden that would result from the
indiscriminate use of financial accounting for tax purposes.7' Generally ac-
cepted accounting principles72 leave much to the discretion of management;
the principles tolerate a range of acceptable treatments rather than require
exact compliance with specific rules. The Thor Court characterized such an
approach as inappropriate for tax accounting purposes because it would re-
sult in inconsistency and unfairness in the tax system.73
III. ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX FOR CORPORATE TAXPAYERS AND
THE BOOK VALUE ADJUSTMENT IN THE TAX REFORM ACT
OF 1986
A. Statutory Provisions
The corporate minimum tax provisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1986
accounting method conforms to generally accepted accounting practices does not mean that it
necessarily clearly reflects income for tax purposes. Id. at 693.
66. Thor, 439 U.S. at 541. The Court relied on Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S.
561, 577 (1978), for this proposition. Frank Lyon held that a sale-and-leaseback arrangement
would be characterized as such for tax purposes if it was a genuine transaction with economic
substance, but the Court noted that "the characterization of a transaction for financial ac-
counting purposes, on the one hand, and for tax purposes, on the other, need not necessarily be
the same." Thor, 439 U.S. at 541 (quoting Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 577). The Court in Thor
also referred to Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 15 (1974), to support this
proposition.
67. Thor, 439 U.S. at 541. As examples for this observation the Court cited Commis-
sioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446 (1959); Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934); and Lucas v.
American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930). All three of those cases dealt with reserves main-
tained in order to satisfy future liabilities. Current deductions to cover future expenses are not
allowed for tax purposes even though such deductions are consistent with generally accepted
accounting principles. Thor, 439 U.S. at 542; Hansen, 360 U.S. at 448; Brown, 291 U.S. at 199;
Lucas, 280 U.S. at 452.
68. Thor, 439 U.S. at 542-43.
69. Id. at 542.
70. Id. at 543.
71. Id. at 544.
72. Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are promulgated by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. E.
FARIS, JR., AccoUNTING FOR LAWYERS 7 (4th ed. 1982).
73. Thor, 439 U.S. at 544. The Court stated:
[Such variances] ... may be tolerable in financial reporting, but they are ques-
tionable in a tax system designed to ensure as far as possible that similarly situ-
ated taxpayers pay the same tax. If management's election among "acceptable"
options were dispositive for tax purposes, a firm, indeed, could decide unilater-
ally-within limits dictated only by its accountants-the tax it wished to pay.




significantly strengthen the impact of the minimum tax on corporations. A
twenty percent alternative minimum tax similar to the individual minimum
tax74 replaces the add-on corporate minimum tax under the new law. An
exemption of $40,000 exists, but it phases out at the rate of twenty-five cents
for every dollar of alternative taxable income in excess of $150,000. 7 5 The
book income adjustment, applicable to the taxable years 1987, 1988, and
1989,76 increases the alternative minimum taxable income by one-half of the
amount of a taxpayer's adjusted net book income that exceeds the alternative
minimum taxable income.77 This effectively results in a ten percent tax on
book income.78 Ignoring the $40,000 exemption amount, if book income is
greater than 2.3 times the amount of alternative minimum taxable income,
then, without any other preference items, the book income adjustment will
generate a minimum tax liability. 79
A corporation's adjusted net book income is the net income reported on
the corporation's applicable financial statement80 adjusted to disregard any
federal income taxes.8 ' Adjustment must also be made for consolidated re-
turns8 2 and returns covering a taxable period that is different from the pe-
riod covered in the financial statement.8 3 Furthermore, special adjustments
exist for cooperatives, 84 for dividends received from companies eligible for
the credit provided by section 936 on income from Puerto Rico, 85 and for
Alaska native corporations.8 6 The Act also authorizes the Secretary of the
74. Summary of Conference Agreement on H.R. 3838 (Tax Reform Act of 1986), supra
note 8, at 25.
75. I.R.C. § 55(d)(3) (1986).
76. Id. § 56(f). This provision does not apply to any S corporations, regulated investment
companies, real estate investment trusts, or REMIC. Id. § 56(f)(4).
77. The alternative minimum taxable income is determined before application of the book
income adjustment and the net operating loss deduction. Id. § 56(f)(1).
78. Senate Tax Reform Bill. Forecast and Implications, [12 Washington Tax Rev.] Tax
Mgmt. (BNA) No. 6, at 168 (June 1986) [hereinafter Forecast and Implications].
79. Committees, supra note 58, at 570. Tax Notes provides the example of a corporation
with regular taxable income of $100, and no other preferences, such that the alternative mini-
mum taxable income base would be $100. With $230 of book income the book income prefer-
ence amount would be $65 (50% x ($230 - $100)). The minimum tax would thus be ($100 +
$65) x 20%, or $33. The regular tax would be $33 (33% x $100), thus an alternative minimum
tax liability would result solely by virtue of the book income adjustment. Id. (This example
ignores the $40,000 exemption amount provided by I.R.C. § 55(d)(2) (1986)).
80. I.R.C. § 56(f)(2)(A) (1986).
81. Id. § 56(f)(2)(B). Foreign taxes are also disregarded unless the taxpayer elects not to
take the benefit of I.R.C. § 901, the foreign tax credit. Id.
82. Id. § 56(f)(2)(C)(i) and (ii). Adjustment must be made so that items on the taxpayer's
applicable financial statement are properly allocated to members included on the consolidated
return. Id. § 56(f)(2)(C)(i). Furthermore, if a related corporation is not included on a consoli-
dated return, the taxpayer's net book income must be adjusted to account for earnings of the
related corporation. Id. § 56(f)(2)(C)(ii). The adjustment is required only to the extent of the
sum of the dividends received from the related corporation and other amounts required to be
included in gross income with respect to the related corporation's earnings under I.R.C. ch. 1.
Id.
83. Id. § 56(f)(2)(D).
84. Id. § 56(f)(2)(E).
85. Id. § 56(f)(2)(F).
86. Id. § 56(f)(2)(G) allows for special treatment of land under the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1620(c) (1982).
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Treasury to adjust the book income to prevent the omission or duplication of
any item.8 7 This grant of authority is an open-ended mandate for the Secre-
tary to issue regulations as the need arises.
In computing the book income adjustment a corporation must use the net
income figure reported on an applicable financial statement. 88 Acceptable
financial statements include the following, listed in the order of priority es-
tablished in the Act:89 (1) a financial statement required to be filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission; (2) a certified, audited income state-
ment used for creditors or shareholders, or for any other substantial nontax
purpose; (3) an income statement to be provided to a government agency; or
(4) an income statement to be provided to creditors or shareholders, or for
any substantial nontax purpose. 90 If a taxpayer does not have one of the
enumerated applicable financial statements, or if it has none other than one
of those listed in (4) above, the taxpayer may elect to use an earnings and
profits figure rather than a net income figure for the purpose of determining
the book income adjustment. 91 Under this election, the taxpayer's earnings
and profits for the taxable year are treated as equal to the net income derived
from applicable financial statements. 92 Once the taxpayer makes this elec-
tion, it remains in effect unless the taxpayer revokes it with consent of the
Secretary. 93
For taxable years beginning after 1989 the Act replaces the book income
adjustment with an adjustment based on adjusted current earnings.94 This
adjustment increases alternative minimum taxable income by seventy-five
percent of the excess of the adjusted current earnings of the corporation over
the alternative minimum taxable income.95 If the alternative minimum taxa-
87. I.R.C. § 56(f)(2)(H) (1986). Anticipated rules include those to adjust the allocation
of income and deductions among two or more businesses owned or controlled by the same
interests, to prevent tax evasion or to reflect clearly the income of the business, as per the
principles of I.R.C. § 482. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 10, at 11-273 to -74. Rules to
adjust book income may also be necessary to avoid distortions of the book income figure via
disclosure of financial information through footnotes to the applicable financial statements and
through supplemental statements. Id.
88. I.R.C. § 56(f)(2)(A) (1986).
89. Id. § 56(f)(3)(C). In establishing priority, the corporation must actually use the finan-
cial statements for the specified purpose; otherwise, the statements will not be eligible for use
as an applicable financial statement. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TAX REFORM ACT OF
1986, S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 531 (1986).
90. I.R.C. § 56(f)(3)(A) (1986). Neither the Act nor the legislative history elaborate on
the meaning of the phrase "substantial nontax purpose."
91. Id. § 56(f)(3)(B). For purposes of this provision, the adjusted current earnings calcu-
lation in I.R.C. § 56(g) (the adjustment for minimum tax for years beginning after 1989) is not
relevant. Id. Furthermore, the earnings and profits figure may not be reduced by the amount
of distributions or federal income taxes payable during the taxable year. Id. Adjustments
must be made for purposes of consolidated returns to prevent the double inclusion of earnings
and profits of an affiliated group of corporations. Id. These adjustments will be governed by
rules prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Id.
92. See id.
93. Id. § 56(f)(3)(B)(ii).
94. Id. § 56(c)(1)(B). This provision does not apply to any S corporations, regulated in-
vestment companies, real estate investment trusts, or REMIC. Id. § 56(g)(6).
95. Id. § 56(g)(1). The alternative minimum taxable income is determined before applica-
tion of the current earnings adjustment and the net operating loss deduction. Id.
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ble income is greater than the adjusted earnings, then seventy-five percent of
the excess applies to reduce the alternative minimum taxable income.96 Any
such reduction, however, may not exceed the excess of aggregate increases in
alternative minimum taxable income, attributable to the current earnings ad-
justment in prior years, over aggregate reductions. 97
In order to determine adjusted current earnings the taxpayer starts from
its alternative minimum taxable income for the taxable year, as determined
prior to application of the current earnings adjustment and the net operating
loss deduction.9 8 The taxpayer must adjust this figure9 9 for depreciation, 100
for amounts included in calculating earnings and profits,10' for deductions
used in calculating earnings and profits,102 for other adjustments to earnings
and profits, 10 3 for loss on exchange of debt pools, 1° 4 for acquisition expenses
of life insurance companies, 10 5 and for depletion. 10 6 Generally, these adjust-
96. Id. § 56(g)(2)(A). A positive amount exceeds a negative amount and a smaller nega-
tive amount exceeds a larger negative amount for purposes of this provision.
97. Id. § 56(g)(2)(B). For example:
adjusted
year current earnings AMTI Adjustment
year 1 400 300 75 (100 X 75%)
year 2 300 300 0
year 3 200 300 (75)
year 4 200 300 0 (limit imposed by prior years)
year 5 100 (100) 150
year 6 200 300 (75)
year 7 (300) (100) (75) (limit imposed by prior years)
98. Id. § 56(g)(3).
99. Id.
100. Id. § 56(g)(4)(A). For the purpose of this provision depreciation is computed using
either the method used by the taxpayer in preparing its applicable financial statement or the
applicable earnings and profit methods, whichever yields the smaller present value. The inter-
est rate used in the present value calculation is the applicable federal rate for the period equal
to the ACR life of the property, unless the Treasury publishes interest rates to be used. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 10, at 11-276.
101. I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(B) (1986). Some amounts are excluded from gross income for pur-
poses of alternative minimum taxable income, but are included in determining earnings and
profits. These amounts are included in income for determining adjusted current earnings, but
are reduced by any deduction that would have been allowed in computing alternative mini-
mum taxable income if such amounts had been included in computing alternative minimum
taxable income. Id. Generally, expense items are not allowed for regular alternative minimum
tax purposes in computing adjusted current earnings. Thus, interest and carrying costs of tax-
exempt bonds are included in calculating adjusted current earnings. H.R. CONF. REP. No.
841, supra note 10, at 11-275.
102. I.R.C. § 56(g)(4)(C) (1986). If an item would not be deductible for purposes of com-
puting earnings and profits, it will not be deductible in computing adjusted current earnings.
Id.
103. Id. § 56(g)(4)(D). I.R.C. § 312(n) adjustments to earnings and profits, which are
made to reflect more accurately economic gain and loss, generally do apply in calculating
adjusted current earnings. Id. Such adjustments include mineral exploration and development
cost capitalization and LIFO inventory adjustments. See id. § 312(n) (paragraphs (7) and (8)
of § 312(n) do not apply under § 56(g)(4)(D)).
104. Id. § 56(g)(4)(E). A loss will not be recognized from an exchange of debt obligations
having substantially the same terms. Id.
105. Id. § 56(g)(4)(F). Such expenses must be capitalized and amortized according to gen-
erally accepted accounting principles in all taxable years. Id.
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ments are designed to account for exclusion items, that is, items of income
and expense that are included in regular earnings and profits, but are never
included in the calculation of minimum taxable income, such as interest on
tax-exempt bonds. 107
Given the complicated adjustments involved in computing the alternative
minimum taxable income, record-keeping will pose a formidable problem.
The Secretary of the Treasury will likely provide regulations or rulings in
this regard. 10 8 The mandated Treasury report on the book income and earn-
ings and profits adjustments will likewise address the matter of record-
keeping. 109
B. Legislative History
The book income adjustment item was not included in the House version
of the tax reform bill," l0 but rather was adopted from the Senate report."'
The conference committee adopted the Senate Report minimum tax provi-
sions practically verbatim, with the addition of special rules for cooperatives
and the switch to the adjustment based on adjusted current earnings after
1989. The conferees also commissioned the Treasury report on the adjust-
ments, thereby expressing some doubt as to the appropriateness of the book
income adjustment or, at least, doubt as to its mechanics."12
The Senate Finance Committee indicated that the Senate included the
book income and current earnings adjustments to ensure that taxpayers with
substantial economic income could not avoid their fair tax liability through
the excessive use of exclusions, deductions, and credits. "3 Both the percep-
tion and the reality of fairness were the target of the Senate in drafting the
provisions. 114 Tax liabilities based on a closer approximation of economic
income, and elimination of publicized instances of corporations with high
book income and low tax liability were goals of the Senate. 1 5 According to
the Finance Committee, the regular minimum tax system alone could not
meet these objectives."1 6
106. Id. § 56(g)(4)(G). The depletion allowance is calculated by either the method used for
book purposes, or the method provided for in I.R.C. § 611, whichever yields the smaller pres-
ent value. Id.
107. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 10, at 11-275.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Tax Reform Bill of 1985-Text of H.R. 3838 as Reported by the House Ways and
Means Committee, 72 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 53 (Dec. 7, 1985).
111. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Summary of Final Agreement by House-Senate Conferees on
Tax Reform Provisions of H.R. 3838, [Bulletin 36 Extra] Fed. Taxes (P-H) 59,710, at 31
(Aug. 17, 1986).
112. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 10, at 11-278 to -79.
113. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, supra note 89, at 518.
114. Id. at 519.
115. Id. The committee recognized that financial accounting is more conservative than tax
accounting and that financial accounting errs on the side of understatement. The committee
felt that because of that understatement alternative minimum taxable income should not fall
below the book income figure. Id. at 519 n.4.
116. Id. at 519. The Senate Report specified that:
The minimum tax cannot successfully address concerns of both real and appar-
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The Senate had debated the matter of a broad-based corporate minimum
tax.1 7 Senate hearings were held several days after this debate. At these
hearings on October 9, 1985, Professor Michael J. Graetz spoke to the Fi-
nance Committee on the subject of minimum tax. 1 8 Professor Graetz pro-
posed a broad-based minimum tax119 with reported profits used as a floor for
minimum taxable income. 120 According to Professor Graetz, connecting the
corporate minimum tax with book income would eliminate publicized inci-
dents of high-profit companies paying little or no tax, and would restore a
public perception of fairness in the tax system. 121 Such a floor would not
add more complexity to the system because corporations must calculate
their book income for financial reporting purposes anyway. Professor
Graetz concluded that such a floor on corporate minimum tax would, in-
deed, increase revenue.1 22
During these hearings the Senate Finance Committee also heard from
Pennsylvania Law Professor Harry Gutman, from Bernard Shapiro, Na-
tional Director for Tax Policy for Price Waterhouse, and from Emil Sunley
of Deloitte Haskins and Sells. 123 Generally, their statements reinforced the
idea of using the corporate minimum tax as a vehicle to promote fairness,
but they warned against using the tax to increase revenue. The speakers
further warned of the added complexities of the alternative minimum tax
and its dampening effect on the use of tax incentives. None of the speakers'
statements responded directly to Professor Graetz's proposal to set book in-
come as a floor for the corporate alternative minimum tax.
Congress's motive behind the book income adjustment provisions was to
ent fairness unless there is certainty that whenever a company publicly reports
substantial earnings ... that company will pay some tax ....
Thus, the committee believes that it is important to provide that the alterna-
tive minimum taxable income of a corporation will be increased when book in-
come for the year exceeds alternative minimum taxable income. Such a
provision will increase both the real and the perceived fairness of the tax system,
eliminate the highly publicized instances in which corporations with substantial
book income have paid no tax, and further broaden the minimum tax base to
approach economic income more closely.
Id. at 520.
117. See 131 CONG. REC. S12,874-80 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1985). The focus of the debate was
deficit reduction. Id. at S12,874-75 (Statement of Sen. Boren). "I think it is imperative that,
before we do anything else, we use the funds that are raised by this corporate minimum tax to
apply to reduce the deficit in this country." Id. at S12,876. The minimum tax proposal passed
88 to 11 after the Senate considered a study by Citizens for Tax Justice. Id. at S12,877-79.
This 1985 study entitled "Corporate Taxpayers and Corporate Freeloaders" reported that of
275 major profitable corporations, 129 paid no federal income taxes in at least one of the four
years from 1981 to 1984. Id. Congress also considered research conducted by Senator DeCon-
cini. Id. at S12,879. Senator DeConcini reported that in 1983 five of the top 10 Department of
Defense contractors paid no corporate income tax. Id.
118. Hearing, supra note 4, at 36 (statement of Professor Michael J. Graetz, Yale Law
School).
119. Id. at 47.
120. Id. at 50-52.
121. Id. at 51.
122. Id. at 52.
123. Id. at 56 (statement of Professor Harry Gutman, University of Pennsylvania Law
School); id. at 5 (statement of Bernard Shapiro, National Director for Tax Policy, Price
Waterhouse); id. at 69 (statement of Emil Sunley, Deloitte Haskins and Sells).
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increase the fairness of the system. Raising revenue was another considera-
tion. Congress was not deterred by the problems of increased complexity,
financial accounting policies and standards, or the blunting of tax incentives.
Congress did evidence some hesitation, however, by including the switch
from the book income adjustment to the current earnings adjustment for tax
years after 1989 and by mandating a study to be completed before the time
of the switch. Politically, Congress did what it felt it had to do. The rheto-
ric of the new tax code is fairness and simplicity, and these new adjustments
appear fair and simple to voters.1 24 The Senate and Conference Reports
stressed the fairness angle while ignoring or substantially downplaying the
added complexity.1 25
IV. OPTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES CONCERNING THE
BOOK INCOME ADJUSTMENT
Four different approaches are available to Congress regarding the book
income adjustment in the corporate alternative minimum tax scheme. These
four options are: (A) fine tune and retain the existing book income adjust-
ment; (B) replace the book income adjustment with an earnings and profits
adjustment; (C) strengthen the corporate alternative minimum tax scheme
so that the book income adjustment is not needed as a backstop provision; or
(D) move to a flat rate, broad-based tax system so that a corporate alterna-
tive minimum tax and its accompanying adjustment is not needed at all.
The first two alternatives merely involve alterations to the minimum tax ad-
justment; the other two options entail broad changes to the corporate alter-
native tax structure.
A. Fine Tune the Existing Book Income Adjustment
The book income adjustment proposals generated extensive concern. 26
As corporate taxpayers file their 1987 tax returns and have to deal with the
book income adjustment provision, this concern will likely grow. Items of
124. See Abbin, Cocrick & Gould, Tax Reform and the Not-So-Minimum Tax Proposals,
28 TAX NOTES, July 22, 1985, at 443; Church, supra note 5, at 12.
125. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 10, at 11-273 to -274 (statement of manag-
ers accompanying H.R. 3838 simply mentioned that rules would have to be prescribed by the
Secretary in order for the adjustment to work properly, but gave no indication of the scope of
these rules); SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, supra note 89, at 534
(Senate Report stated that adjustments were not intended to interfere otherwise with the
choice of a reasonable accounting method). Such statements ignore the complexities involved.
126. Eg., Committees, supra note 58, at 569-72 (suggests proposal would create serious
problems); Forecast and Implications, supra note 78, at 168 (observes tax practitioners' and
accountants' concerns); Sunley, Thinking About Senator Packwood's Alternative Minimum Tax
for Corporations, 31 TAX NOTES, Apr. 28, 1986, at 395-98 (expresses concern that provision
adds complexity and administrative difficulties, and that provision will operate discriminately);
Berton, Tax Proposal Could Create Problem over Profit Reported to Shareholders, Wall St. J.,
May 20, 1986, at 4, col. 2 (concern of accountants and businessmen); Tax Report [Minimum
Tax Plans], Wall St. J., May 28, 1986, at 1, col. 5 (quotes Paul Lowry of Peat Marwick as




concern include the use of financial accounting figures for tax purposes, 127
the increased complexity in determining tax liability, 128 and the taxation of
tax-exempt income 129 that will result from the adjustment.
The use of financial accounting for tax purposes raises both policy and
technical concerns.' 30 The book income adjustment indiscriminately taxes
reported income in excess of the alternative minimum taxable income. In so
doing, the adjustment indirectly cuts back on other preference items, thereby
hampering these preferences. 131 For example, if the accounting rules are dif-
ferent for inclusion of a preference item for tax versus financial reporting
purposes, a preference item may be taxed by the minimum income tax and
then taxed again by the book income adjustment to the minimum tax. 132
The concern over timing issues is also important even when no tax prefer-
ences are involved. Financial accounting is often based on the accrual
method of reporting income, whereas some provisions in the tax code force
use of the cash method. 133 A taxpayer will likely recognize an income item
for book purposes before he does so for tax purposes.' 34 This result will
increase book income in reference to the minimum taxable income and could
cause a minimum tax liability through operation of the book income adjust-
ment. When the taxpayer finally realizes the income item for tax purposes,
the income will be fully taxable under the regular income tax scheme. 135
For example, if the cost of a major hazardous waste cleanup is accrued for
book purposes one year and expensed for tax purposes the next, the book
127. Tax Report [Minimum Tax Plans], supra note 126, at 1, col. 5.
128. Sunley, supra note 126, at 397.
129. Forecast and Implications, supra note 78, at 168.
130. See generally supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text; Cox, Conflicting Concepts of
Income for Managerial and Federal Income Tax Purposes, 33 ACCT. REV. 242, 242-45 (1958)
(major points of conflict exist between tax and financial accounting; tax law can improperly
influence accounting principles); Healy, Narrowing the Gap Between Tax and Financial Ac-
counting, 22 TUL. TAX. INST. 407, 414-20 (1973) (financial and tax accounting have different
goals and timing differences; Treasury should not attempt to regulate this area; regulation (as
proposed by 1986 Tax Reform Act) would break down spirit of cooperation between IRS and
accounting profession); McClure, Diverse Tax Interpretations of Accounting Concepts, 142 J.
ACCT., Oct. 1976, at 67, 68-74 (IRS and accounting profession interpret differently such un-
derlying concepts as the accrual method, the going concern concept, the matching concept,
and the realization concept); Raby & Richter, Conformity of Tax and Financial Accounting,
139 J. ACCT., Mar. 1975, at 42, 44-48 (from accountant's point of view, use of financial ac-
counting figures for tax purposes exerts pressure on accountants to use procedures that pro-
duce the best tax benefits; such procedures do not provide meaningful figures for either the IRS
or shareholders, do not reduce cost for either group, and dull evolutionary changes in financial
accounting; from IRS viewpoint use of financial accounting figures handicaps administration
of tax law and converts the IRS into arbiter of accounting practice); Simonetti, A Challenge,
Can the Accounting Profession Lead the Tax System, 126 J. ACcT., Sept. 1968, at 66, 68 (re-
quirements of income tax system are often different from requirements of good accounting).
131. Advisory Board Outlook, Ways and Means Member Daub Assesses Conference, [12
Washington Tax. Rev.] Tax Mgmt. (BNA) No. 8, at 207 (Aug. 1986).
132. Sunley, supra note 126, at 397.
133. See generally Cox, supra note 130, at 243.
134. For example, some expenses must be prorated for tax purposes, but treated as current
expenses for financial accounting purposes. Cf Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
415 F.2d 1341, 1343-44 (7th Cir. 1969) (disallowed deduction for interest expense even though
it would be an expense for financial accounting).
135. Sunley, supra note 126, at 397; Committees, supra note 58, at 569, 571.
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income in the later year may be higher than the alternative minimum taxable
income because the expenses will not be deducted from book income that
year. Thus, an alternative minimum tax liability may result solely from the
book income adjustment. 136 Congress could add a credit to bridge timing
differences and alleviate this problem;' 37 such a credit, however, would add
yet another layer of complexity to the book income adjustment provision. 38
On a broader level, the use of financial accounting figures for tax purposes
will likely cause companies to have tax consequences in mind as they prepare
their financial statements.139 A related concern is that the book income ad-
justment will lead tax officials into the arena of financial accounting stan-
dards.140 The problem is that tax and financial accounting serve two
separate purposes.1 4 1 Using a tax provision that may alter financial report-
ing may not be wise. The practice will likely undermine the quality of
information provided to shareholders, management, and creditors of corpo-
rations. 142 Furthermore, the provision will result in accountants having too
much control over a corporation's minimum tax base143 such that similarly
situated companies will be taxed differently depending on their chosen
method of financial accounting.44
Adjustments to book income for purposes of the book income adjustment
could alleviate some of the problems mentioned above. Some adjustments
already required to be made to the book income figure 14 5 are necessary,146
but complicated. Congress could further modify book income for each pref-
136. Sunley, supra note 126, at 397.
137. Id.
138. See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
139. UhIfelder, supra note 58, at 197. A recent Wall Street Journal article quotes Mr.
Alfred King, managing director of the National Association of Accountants, as saying: "The
purpose of tax simplification should be to get away from a tax-driven economy filled with tax
shelters. But this provision puts pressure on businessmen and accountants alike to make tax-
driven decisions." Berton, supra note 126, at 4, col. 5. The Berton article also quotes the
Financial Accounting Standards Board as saying the book value preference is a bad idea and
that "[t]ax policies shouldn't interfere with external financial reporting, which has different
aims and goals." Id. col. 4. The Berton article notes that the reason that reported income is
often higher than tax income is that certain deductions are allowed for tax purposes that are
not recognized for reporting purposes. Id. Another concern caused by using financial ac-
counting figures for tax purposes is that the independence of outside auditors may be
compromised.
140. Tax Report, [Minimum Tax Plans], supra note 126, at 1, col. 3.
141. See supra note 130 and accompanying text; Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner,
439 U.S. 522, 542-43 (1979); supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text.
142. Uhlfelder, supra note 58, at 197; see Sunley, supra note 126, at 396 (book income
preference creates incentive to use reserves to reduce book income).
143. Uhlfelder, supra note 58, at 197; see Committees, supra note 58, at 571 n.7 (account-
ant's use of purchase accounting may allow a corporation to realize larger deductions for book
purposes than for tax, thereby reducing disparity between book income and taxable income
and avoiding tax liability imposed by book income adjustment); Raby & Richter, supra note
130, at 48 (accounting figures are often approximations unsuited for income determination);
Sunley, supra note 126, at 396-97 (Treasury would lose control over tax base if minimum tax
base defined as book income; same problem exists to a lesser degree under book income prefer-
ence provision).
144. Uhlfelder, supra note 58, at 197.
145. See I.R.C. § 56(f)(2)(1986).
146. Sunley, supra note 126, at 396.
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erence item added back or not added back to taxable income; Congress
could also make modifications to account for timing differences. These mod-
ifications would avoid double taxation or omissions. Nevertheless, the re-
sulting book income adjustment provision would be exceedingly complex.1 47
Another unattractive feature of the book income adjustment is that it
taxes otherwise tax-exempt increases in book income, such as tax-exempt
bond income, 148 gain on liquidation of property not recognized under sec-
tion 337,149 and other tax-free exchanges such as certain reorganizations and
involuntary conversions of property.1 50 The book income adjustment thus
interferes with the policies of the regular tax, and is, therefore, unfair. 5 ,
Adjustments to book income might avoid this problem, but again, more ad-
justments would add to the complexity of the minimum tax provisions.
The proponents of the book income adjustment stress that it will increase
the perceived fairness of the tax system. The question is: At what expense?
The book income adjustment is unfair to corporations. It improperly in-
volves the use of financial accounting for tax purposes, it adds complexity to
the tax system at a time when simplicity is sought, and it taxes otherwise
tax-exempt income. Further adjustments to avoid some of these problems
would improve the provision. Such adjustments, however, would complicate
the system further without curing all of the problems accompanying the pro-
vision. For these reasons, Congress should not retain the book income
adjustment.
B. Replace the Book Income Adjustment with the
Current Earnings Adjustment
The earnings adjustment alternative avoids the problems of using financial
accounting for tax purposes, but involves a good deal of complexity. This
alternative has been described as the lesser of two evils as between the book
income adjustment and the earnings adjustment.1 5 2 The earnings adjust-
ment involves concepts somewhat familiar to tax accounting. 153 The Tax
147. Id. at 397; Committees, supra note 58, at 571.
148. Forecast and Implications, supra note 78, at 168; Government Finance Officers Associa-
tion Finds "Serious Flaw" in Finance Committee Bill's Alternative Minimum Tax Provision, 31
TAX NOTES, June 13, 1986, at 305. Some bond income is not taxed. I.R.C. § 103 (1986). This
bond income, however, is included in income for financial reporting purposes. A tax on finan-
cially reported income would thus tax bond income that Congress has deemed nontaxable.
149. I.R.C. § 337 (1986) deems gain on certain liquidation sales nontaxable. Such gain
would be included in book income, so a tax on book income would tax a gain that Congress
has deemed nontaxable.
150. Committees, supra note 58, at 571. The Code treats reorganizations in certain receiv-
ership and bankruptcy proceedings as nontaxable. I.R.C. § 371 (1986). The Code also does
not tax gain from the sale of stock to stock ownership plans. Id. § 1042. Gain from sales or
exchanges undertaken to effectuate the policies of the Federal Communications Commission is
likewise nontaxable; id. § 1071, as is gain on exchanges or distributions made pursuant to
orders of the S.E.C., id. § 1081.
151. The regular tax policies encourage certain activity. The minimum tax provisions then
come in through the back door to tax that activity.
152. Uhlfelder, supra note 58, at 197.
153. I.R.C. § 312 (1986). The Code does not actually define earnings and profits, but
rather § 312 prescribes the effects of particular transactions on earnings and profits. Other
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Reform Act of 1984154 modified the earnings and profits calculation such
that it now can be a fairly close measure of economic income. 155 The earn-
ings adjustment approach may not, however, alleviate instances in which
corporations report income to shareholders, yet pay no tax. 156 This alterna-
tive is fair because it taxes economic income. Nevertheless, the alternative
fails to address the problem of perceived fairness of the tax system to the
same extent that the book income adjustment does because earnings and
profits are less comprehensible to the general public. Thus, the earnings ad-
justment alternative lacks the political appeal of the book income adjust-
ment; it does not provide Congress with an approach that the general public
will perceive as simple and fair.
The current earnings adjustment also has another problem. Not only does
the adjustment appear complex, it is complex. Special adjustments are re-
quired for exclusion items, 157 and even more adjustments are needed to
avoid taxing tax-exempt income. 158 Even if such adjustments were not re-
quired, this alternative would still add complexity to the tax system for it is
yet another taxable income figure that taxpayers must spend time and money
to compute.
C Strengthen the Alternative Minimum Tax Scheme So That
Adjustments Such as the Book Income or Current Earnings
Adjustment Are Not Needed
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the book income adjustment acts as a
backstop to the alternative minimum tax; the adjustment comes into effect if
book income exceeds alternative minimum taxable income. Congress, by
providing such a backstop, avoided the question of whether to strengthen the
alternative minimum tax to avoid the need for a backstop provision in the
first place. A strong minimum tax might not need a backstop.
Fortifying the minimum tax could be done in one of two ways. First, the
existing alternative tax could be strengthened through modifications such as
decreasing the exemption amount, increasing the tax rate, capping the use of
preferences so that a taxpayer's effective tax rate does not fall below a certain
level, 159 and expanding the list of preferences subject to the minimum tax so
as to move to a broad-based minimum tax. 16" A second alternative for
strengthening the minimum tax would be to base the minimum tax solely on
Code provisions and case law help clarify the meaning of earnings and profits. See B. BITIKER
& J. EUSTICE, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 7.03 (1980); A. PARKER, E. KRADER, S. LEIMBERG & M. SATINSKY,
STANLEY & KILCULLEN'S FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW § 6-5, at 6, 28, 29, 30 (7th ed. 1983);
J. PARKER, supra note 13, § 9.07a.
154. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 579.
155. J. PARKER, supra note 13, § 9.07a; Sunley, supra note 126, at 397.
156. Sunley, supra note 126, at 397.
157. I.R.C. § 56(g)(4) (1986).
158. Committees, supra note 58, at 572.
159. Sunley, supra note 126, at 396.
160. A broad-based minimum tax was proposed by Professor Graetz. Hearing, supra note
4, at 47-48 (statement of Professor Michael J. Graetz, Yale Law School).
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earnings and profits. 161 Rather than starting with taxable income and ad-
ding back preferences, the earnings and profits figure16 2 could serve as a
base, reduced by specific deductions.163 One problem with this second alter-
native, however, is that earnings and profits are not that well defined in the
Code and are difficult to calculate.' 64 The earnings and profits calculation,
though, is intended to measure economic income, 6 5 and in that respect us-
ing earnings and profits as a minimum tax base is fair. Also, in some cases
the earnings and profits figure is calculated to determine whether a corporate
distribution represents dividends or a return of capital, so that in such a case
the alternative minimum tax calculation would merely involve adapting the
predetermined earnings and profits figure. Thus, using the earnings and
profits approach could be simple. Most taxpayers, however, do not compute
earnings and profits each year. 166
Strengthening the alternative minimum tax by making it broad-based,
with lower exemptions, higher rates, caps on use of preferences, and a longer
list of preferences, is more desirable than using earnings and profits as a base
for the tax. The earnings and profits calculation is more complicated and
less well defined, and it involves taxing otherwise tax-free income. Using a
broad-based alternative minimum tax based on preferences undoubtedly
adds fairness to the tax system. Thus, such an approach is politically appeal-
ing in the context of tax reform rhetoric. The biggest problems remain both
the complexity of such a tax and the inconsistency of allowing tax prefer-
ences in the regular tax system and then taxing them in the alternative tax
system. The complexity involved, however, is less than that involved with
either the book income adjustment or the current earnings adjustment be-
cause both adjustment calculations involve the alternative minimum tax cal-
culation complexity as well as the adjustment calculation complexity.
D. Move to a Flat-Rate, Broad-Based Income Tax System That
Eliminates the Need for a Minimum Tax
Arguably, eliminating the need for a minimum tax is the most direct ap-
proach available to Congress. 167 This approach is both simple and fair.
161. Committees, supra note 58, at 572.
162. I.R.C. § 312 (1986) could be used to determine earnings and profits with further re-
finements as necessary.
163. Professor Graetz proposed a similar approach except that he used gross income as a
base. Hearing, supra note 4, at 48-49 (statement of Professor Michael J. Graetz, Yale Law
School).
164. Committees, supra note 58, at 572.
165. Id. at 571. In determining earnings and profits, adjustments are made to taxable in-
come to net out such items as federal income taxes, dividends paid, and life insurance premi-
ums paid, and to add back such items as the dividend received deduction, nontaxable interest
income, and depreciation deducted in excess of straight-line depreciation. J. PARKER, supra
note 13, at 364-65.
166. Sunley, supra note 126, at 397; J. PARKER, supra note 13, at 365.
167. See Graetz, supra note 6, at 529 n.9, citing the following for discussion of the merits of
a broad-based tax: Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80
HARV. L. REV. 925 (1967); Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base:
The Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1032 (1968); Mus-
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Congress, however, is not likely to change the tax system in such a manner
because the change is not politically attractive since all taxpayers would lose
their favorite tax preferences. The minimum tax system is complicated, and
its very existence is an admission that something is wrong with the regular
tax system. 168 Since a move to a broad-based income tax with low, flat rates
is politically unlikely, 169 the minimum tax provision must serve as a compro-
mise solution to the competing policies of the tax system. 170
E. Recommendation
Given that the political restraints on Congress make it unlikely that the
legislators will seriously consider eliminating the need for a minimum tax,
Congress should adopt the third alternative approach by strengthening the
alternative minimum tax scheme so that backstop provisions such as the
book income adjustment are not needed. This option is the most fair, sim-
ple, effective, and realistic approach. Admittedly, this approach does add
some complexity to the tax system. The complexity is, however, less than
that involved in the book income adjustment and the current earnings ad-
justment, and it is a necessary compromise for the added fairness that the
approach will bring to the Code.
V. CONCLUSION
In the area of the minimum tax Congress faces the task of achieving a fair
and simple income tax system in the face of the competing and contradictory
objectives of fair revenue raising and social and economic policy incentives.
Congress is not likely to drop either objective in the near future. The prob-
lem of reconciling the two objectives will, therefore, remain. The book in-
come adjustment provision in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, although not an
adequate solution, is at least an admission of the problem and a first step
toward solving the problem. The book income adjustment remains too com-
plicated and relies too heavily on financial accounting to deserve a perma-
nent place in the income tax system. The current earnings adjustment is
better, but it also is too complicated. The abolition of the minimum tax
system altogether in favor of a broad-based regular income tax system is
theoretically attractive; its implementation is unlikely, however, considering
that the minimum tax system is a necessary compromise between the com-
peting goals of the tax system: the goal to use preferences to promote policy
objectives and to respond to special interest groups, and the goal to increase
tax revenue. Both goals seem politically necessary. The remaining alterna-
tive is to strengthen the alternative minimum tax system with a lower ex-
grave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 63 (1967). See generally Graetz,
supra note 6 (general discussion of a broad-based income tax systems).
168. Birnbaum, A Minimum Tax to Catch Those Who Pay Little Is the Sleeper Issue of the
Senate Overhaul Plan, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1986, at 52, col. 1. Birnbaum quotes Sen. Malcom
as saying "[the minimum tax] is an admission of tax-drafting incompetence." Id. col. 3.
169. See generally Graetz, supra note 6.
170. Hearing, supra note 4, at 39-40 (statement of Professor Michael J. Graetz, Yale Law
School).
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emption amount and a more comprehensive list of tax preferences. This
strengthened minimum tax would effectively limit the benefit of tax prefer-
ences so as not to reduce effective corporate tax rates below a certain level.
Such an approach would make the tax system more fair, with the least
amount of additional complexity, and would be a politically realistic com-
promise to the competing goals of the income tax system.
